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Abstract
For network computers to communicate to one another,
they need to know one another’s IP address and MAC
address. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is devel-
oped to find the Ethernet address that map to a specific
IP address. The source computer broadcasts the request
for Ethernet address and eventually the target computer
replies. The IP to Ethernet address mapping would later
be stored in an ARP Cache for some time duration, after
which the process is repeated. Since ARP is susceptible
to ARP poisoning attacks, we propose to make it uni-
cast, centralized and secure, along with a secure design of
DHCP protocol to mitigate MAC spoofing. The secure
protocol designs are explained in detail. Lastly we also
discuss some performance issues to show how the pro-
posed protocols work.
Keywords: Address Resolution Protocol, DHCP, MAC ad-
dress and network security.
1 Introduction
The data link layer hardware does not understand the
IP addresses. It only understands the physical address
or MAC address. A computer cannot use MAC address
alone to communicate to others in a network. Usually the
computers are attached to any network using a network
interface card that has with a unique physical address
called as MAC address (or 48-bit Ethernet address). No
two cards would have the same address since such net-
work card manufacturers get the card numbers from a
central authority that would assign only unique MAC ad-
dresses. This can very well avoid MAC address conflict.
These cards know nothing about the IP address of the
computer where it is housed [1]. In the following sec-
tions we outline two new protocols – a new centralized
protocol called Secure Unicast Address Resolution Pro-
tocol (S-UARP) to mitigate ARP poisoning attacks and
a new secure DHCP protocol to mitigate MAC spoofing
attacks. The organization of further sections are as fol-
lows: Section 2 describes on the current ARP and DHCP
protocols, section 3 briefly explains on the ARP poison-
ing and its implementation, section 4 shows related work,
section 5 to 7 explains on the S-UARP protocol proposal
and related issues, section 8 is on MAC spoofing attack
and implementation, section 9 is on secure DHCP proto-
col, section 10 is performance analysis and section 11 is
the conclusion.
2 The ARP and DHCP Protocols
2.1 The Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP)
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) which is defined in
RFC 826 [2] is used to map the IP addresses onto the
data link layer MAC address. It is explained as follows.
Consider the Figure 1 on interconnected networks.
Figure 1: Interconnected networks (two bus networks
with a ring network in middle). Each computer on LAN
has been shown with an IP address and MAC address.
We note that two computers (A and B) on LAN1 have
IP address, MAC address pair as [IP A, MAC A] and
[IP B, MAC B] respectively. Similarly, two computers on
LAN3 (C and D) have IP address, MAC address pair as
[IP C, MAC C], [IP D, MAC D]. Also note that the two
routers (R1 and R2) between the networks have two IP
address corresponding to the link to bus and ring network.
Each router possesses unique MAC address. For a user
A on LAN1 to send packets to user on B within LAN1
the following happens: A query to DNS would return the
IP address IP B. It then frames a packet with IP B in
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the destination field and passes it to IP layer to trans-
mit. The IP layer sees that the address is on the same
network. But it needs to find B’s MAC address. To find
that it broadcasts a packet asking, “Who own IP address
IP B?”. This broadcast would reach on all computers in
LAN1. Only computer B would respond with its MAC
address MAC B. Thus ARP works by this request and
reply approach. The method is quite simple [1].
Some optimizations are possible with ARP. Once com-
puter A gets the ARP reply from B, it stores that IP-
to-MAC address mapping of B in a local cache. So if in
a short period of time, if A wants to communicate with
B, it refers to the local ARP cache, eliminating a second
broadcast. Usually, A would include its IP-to-MAC ad-
dress mapping in the ARP packet, thus informing B of
its mapping. In fact all machines on LAN1 can enter this
mapping information on A into their ARP cache. An-
other optimization is to have every computer broadcast
its mapping when it boots, in the form of an ARP looking
for its won address. To allow for changes in mapping, es-
pecially when network card breaks down, and is replaced
with a new one, entries in ARP cache should time out
after few minutes [3].
2.2 The Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP)
DHCP stands for ‘Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol’
and is a way by which networked computers get their
TCP/IP networking settings from a central server. Dy-
namic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) is defined in RFC
2131 [4] and 2132 [5]. It is an extension of BOOTP,
the previous IP allocation specification. It allows manual
and dynamic IP address assignment to computers that re-
quests for that. DHCP server is not reachable by broad-
casting from a different network. Hence a DHCP relay
agent is needed to forward the DHCP DISCOVER broad-
cast packet from a newly booted machine. It is send as a
unicast transmission to the DHCP server (which may be
on another network) by the relay agent. The relay agent
usually keeps the IP address of the DHCP server. Thus
the relay agent is for relaying packets between servers and
clients. This makes the DHCP server handle the sub-net
that has no server available and thus there is no need to
setup a server per sub-net. To keep track of the duration
of IP address assignment, a DHCP server uses the concept
of leasing. As mentioned before, the DHCP server assigns
IP addresses automatically from a pool of IP addresses.
If a compute leaves the network ‘abruptly’ and does not
return the IP address that it was using, that IP address is
lost for any further assignment. As a precaution to that,
assignment of IP address is only for a fixed duration of
time, called leasing. Just before the expiry of the lease,
a computer should request the DHCP server for renewal.
Otherwise, that IP address cannot be used further [1].
A DHCP client may receive offers from multiple DHCP
servers and can accept any one of the offers; however, the
client usually accepts the first offer it receives. Addition-
Figure 2: DHCP protocol operation
ally, the offer from the DHCP server is not a guaran-
tee that the IP address will be allocated to the client;
however, the server usually reserves the address until the
client has had a chance to formally request the address.
The client returns a formal request for the offered IP ad-
dress to the DHCP server in a DHCPREQUEST broad-
cast message. The DHCP server confirms that the IP
address has been allocated to the client by returning a
DHCPACK unicast message to the client as in Figure 2.
The formal request for the offered IP address (the
DHCPREQUEST message) that is sent by the client is
broadcast so that all other DHCP servers that received
the DHCPDISCOVER broadcast message from the client
can reclaim the IP addresses that they offered to the
client.
If the configuration parameters sent to the client in
the DHCPOFFER unicast message by the DHCP server
are invalid (a misconfiguration error exists), the client re-
turns a DHCPDECLINE broadcast message to the DHCP
server.
The DHCP server will send to the client a DHCPNAK
denial broadcast message, which means the offered con-
figuration parameters have not been assigned, if an error
has occurred during the negotiation of the parameters or
the client has been slow in responding to the DHCPOF-
FER message (the DHCP server assigned the parameters
to another client) of the DHCP server.
3 ARP Poisoning Security Attack
and Implementation
In ARP Poisoning, forged ARP request and reply pack-
ets are used to update the target computer’s ARP cache.
The target computer is being fooled into believing that
the attacker computer (which has a totally different MAC
and IP address) as the computer that has the desired IP
address with a specific MAC address. Thus, the attacker
can monitor the packet sent by the target computer to the
original destination since it is sent to the attacker’s com-
puter first before they are sent to the original destination
[6].
In the ARP poisoning experiment, two desktop com-
puters and one laptop was used as in Figure 3. The two
desktop computers (Computer A and Computer B) acted
as the victims while the laptop (Computer C) acted as the
attacker as in Figure 4. A was the source while B was the
destination. C was equipped with the Ethereal packet
capturing software [7] and the ARP poisoning software
known as Cain & Abel [8]. Computer A was used to send
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Figure 3: ARP Poisoning Implementation in our lab.
continuous ICMP packets to B by pinging B. When ARP
poisoning was carried out using Cain and Abel software
installed on C on Computer A’s ARP cache, it was ob-
served in the Ethereal software on C that the ICMP pack-
ets were sent only between Computer A and Computer C
(attacker), even though A sent it to B. In Cain and Abel
software, it was observed that Computer C could mon-
itor the ICMP packets sent between those two comput-
ers. It showed that Computer A has been fooled to send
ICMP packets to Computer C, which has a different set of
MAC and IP address from Computer B. Also, Computer
C could then forward these packets to B, after keeping a
copy to itself.
Thus ARP poisoning is a method of attacking a net-
work by updating the target computer’s ARP cache with
forged ARP request and reply packets in an effort to
change the Layer 2 Ethernet MAC address to one that
the attacker can monitor. The target computer sends
frames that were meant for the original destination to the
attacker’s computer, so that the frames can be read since
the ARP replies have been forged. A successful ARP at-
tempt is invisible to the user.
The actual configuration used for the attack in our
lab is as follows. Computer A and Computer B were the
victims and Computer C acted as the attacker.
Computer A: Desktop computer
(IP address: 172.20.122.84)
Ethernet adapter
Computer B: Desktop computer
(IP address: 172.20.122.57)
3 Com 11Mbps Office Wireless Adapter
Computer C: Laptop
(IP address 172.20.122.114)
VT6105 Rhine III Fast Ethernet Adapter
Software used – Cain and Abel, Ethereal
Initially at Computer B, the ping command was
given continuously to Computer A by issuing “ping –t
172.20.122.84” at the command prompt. At Computer
C, Ethereal was initiated and the appropriate Ethernet
adapter was selected. Computer C could only capture
packets that were to and from it and broadcast pack-
ets. Thus Cain and Abel (ARP poisoning) software was
needed to redirect the traffic to Computer C, so that it
could sniff the ICMP packets. Without Cain and Abel, no
Figure 4: List of hosts in the network is shown using Cain
and Abel software.
Figure 5: Selection of target computers to perform ARP
poisoning in Cain and Abel software
ICMP packets would be shown in the Ethereal software
(on C) as Computer B was pinging Computer A.
Cain and Abel software was started and the appro-
priate adapter based on IP address is selected. Next the
sniffer was started and all the hosts were selected for MAC
address scanning. Then the lists of hosts available in the
network would be displayed on Cain and Abel software.
The ARP tab was clicked and “ + ” tab is selected to
add the victim computers to be poisoned. Computer B’s
IP was selected at the left column of the “New ARP Poi-
son Routing” pop up window and Computer A’s IP at the
right column was also selected as in Figure 5. The start
ARP tab was clicked to start the poisoning. The status
“Idle” would change to “Poisoning” and packets transfer
between Computer A and Computer B could be noticed
on Computer C (attacker). Using Ethereal on Computer
C, the ICMP packets transfer between Computer A and
Computer B are shown in Figure 6. The communication
between A and B can be monitored through Cain and
Abel software as shown in Figure 7.
4 Related Work on Secure ARP
A research publication [9] on Secure ARP (S-ARP) has
been done by D. Bruschi et al. which deals with ARP
broadcast communication security. Here each host has a
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Figure 6: ICMP packets transferred between the target
computers shown in Ethereal.
Figure 7: ICMP packets transferred between A and B is
monitored by Cain and Abel software.
public/private key pair certified by a local trusted party
on the LAN, which acts as a Certification Authority. Mes-
sages are digitally signed by the sender, thus preventing
the injection of spurious and/or spoofed information. It
has been implemented also in Linux [9]. Tripunitara et.
al. had outlined a middleware approach to the prevention
of ARP cache poisoning as given in [10].
5 The Secure Unicast ARP (S-
UARP) Protocol
The S-UARP proposal we make is unicast in nature and
have different options for security implementation. Many
organizations would have implemented a DHCP server for
dynamic IP address assignment to individual machines
in a LAN. Hence the DHCP server can be configured to
have the MAC-to-IP address mapping or vice-versa for
all the computers/hosts under its domain. We propose to
extend the DHCP protocol to handle Secure Unicast Ad-
dress Resolution Protocol (S-UARP) packets. We denote
such a server as DHCP+ server from now on. The DHCP
relay agent also needs to be modified to forward the S-
UARP request/response messages. When using dynamic
IP addressing using DHCP, the DHCP+ server stores the
mapping of IP to MAC address as it leases out the IP
address to the requesting hosts. We are not dealing with
static IP addressing option in this section. But some suit-
able modification to this protocol can make it suitable for
static addressing as noted in the next section. The pro-
posal itself has an inherent partial-security against eaves-
dropping compared to ARP broadcast in a wired network,
since packets are unicast in nature and is not broadcasted.
In a wireless network, a packet sniffer can capture these
unicast packets too since the radio transmission has no
defined boundaries of transmission. But we add security
into our protocol proposal.
5.1 S-UARP Protocol
This is a centralized protocol unlike the decentralized ap-
proach in normal ARP. Consider the following notations
and their meaning as shown below.
Notation Meaning
S-UARP req : S-UARP Request Packet
S-UARP res : S-UARP Response Packet
DHCP+ : DHCP+ Server
ICP : Integrity Check Pass (security flag)
ICF : Integrity Check Fail (security flag)
A : Host A
B : Host B
IP A : IP address of A
MAC A : MAC address of A
IP B : IP address of B
MAC B : MAC address of B
SK : Session key
KSA : Shared secret key between host A
and the server
MIC : Message Integrity Code
H : Collision Free One-Way Hash Func-
tion
t : Time (independent variable) with
one or more independent values.
t1 : Time period (duration) when re-
ceiver waits for S-UARP req
t2 : Time period when sender looks for
a packet to be sent to the same host
where ACK has to be sent.
t3 : Time period within ACK packet
has to be sent. (t3 ¿ t2)
t4 : Time period after which S-UARP
cache needs refreshing.
The S-UARP protocol (for dynamic IP addressing) is
described as follows in 3 steps:
1. A → DHCP+: S-UARP req
2. DHCP+ → A: S-UARP res + MIC
3. A → DHCP+: (ACK)KSA
A simple example and explanation to show how this
can be implemented with DES algorithm is as follows:
1) When a host A wants to communicate to host B,
it sends a S-UARP request packet (unicast packet)
to the DHCP+ server (which answers the S-UARP
packets), instead of sending a broadcast to all. We
assume that the secret hashing key (KSA) is dis-
tributed between the client and the server, using
private-public key mechanism or any other secure
mechanism.
2) The DHCP+ server encrypts the response message
using DES with cipher block chaining (CBC). It cuts
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the message (S-UARP res) into predetermined-sized
of i blocks (where i = 1, 2, . . . ., n). Use the CBC
residue (that is the last block output by CBC pro-
cess) as a message integrity code (MIC). This MIC
would act as a checksum [11]. The plaintext message
plus the MIC would be transmitted to the host (re-
ceiver) or A. i.e. DHCP+ Server Host A: Transmit
S-UARP response (plain text) + MIC. The transmit-
ted response message will be as in Figure 8.
Figure 8: The S-UARP response message and MIC trans-
mitted from DHCP+ Server.
If the response message doesn’t arrive within a time
period t1, host A will retransmit another S-UARP
request packet to server. This can continue until it
gets a request packet.
3) Once the UARP response is received, host A checks
for validity by using its secret key. The receiver (Host
A) encrypts the plaintext S-UARP res using DES
that it received with the shared secret key and do the
hashing process to produce similar MIC (say, MIC*).
Finally it checks the CBC residue or MIC. If MIC =
MIC*, the message is a non-tampered in transit. We
then call it Integrity Check Pass (ICP) state. Oth-
erwise it is Integrity Check Fail (ICF) state and is
discarded. The S-UARP response contains time ts
when it was generated by the server. Host A also
checks the freshness of the response by checking tr –
ts = ∆t (similar to t3), where tr is the time when
A receives the response from the server and ∆t is
the accepted time interval for transmission delay. Fi-
nally, the host A sends an encrypted acknowledgment
(ACK)KSA to the server. ACK contains the times-
tamp ta generated by the host A to ensure that the
message is fresh and is not a replay.
The entries in S-UARP cache remains valid for a time
period, t4 (say, in minutes) as in ARP protocol. Once
that time period expires, a new S-UARP request need to
be sent by a host to DHCP+ server to get the IP-to-MAC
address mapping. This can deal with a situation of change
in ethernet card for a machine.
5.2 Detailed Explanation
The protocol can be shown in detail as follows, with pos-
sible optimization (as explained under section 5.3). When
DHCP+ Server assigns a dynamic IP address to a host,
the IP and MAC address of the DHCP+ server should be
made known to the host.
Procedure S-UARP Communication (A→B)
BEGIN:
Initialize the flag [pkt send (from→to)] = failure;
while (pkt send (A→DHCP+) == failure)
{
Initialize t;
S-UARP req (IP A, MAC A, IP B);
A→DHCP+: Sends S-UARP req; //no broadcast
if ( t < t1)
pkt send (A→DHCP+) = success;
else
pkt send (A→DHCP+) = failure;
} //while loop
while (pkt send (A→DHCP+) == success || t > t3)
{
Initialize t;
S-UARP res (IP A, MAC A, IP B, MAC B, ts)
DHCP+→A: Sends UARP res + MIC;
if (pkt send (DHCP+→A) == success && t < t2 &&
ICP)
{
Host A→DHCP+: Piggyback (ACK)KSA;
if (pkt send (A→DHCP+) == success)
S-UARP Cache updated;
else
Go to start of enclosed while loop; flag = success;
A→B: A communicates to B directly;
}
else if (pkt send (DHCP+→A) == success &&
t2 < t < t3 && ICP)
{
Host A DHCP+: Sends (ACK)KSA packet;
if (pkt send (A→DHCP+) == success)
S-UARP Cache updated;
else
Go to start of enclosed while loop; flag = success;
A→B: A communicates to B directly;
}
else if (pkt send (DHCP+→A) == failure || t > t3)
{
Go to start of enclosed while loop;
}
} //while loop
if (t > t4 || ICF )
S-UARP Communication (A→B);
END: //end of procedure
5.3 Possible Optimization
An optimization possible is that the ACK can be piggy-
backed on another packet to the DHCP+ server, if packet
transmission from host A to server happens within time
t2. This can eliminate the separate ACK packet sent
and save ACK congestion in the network. If there is
no scope for piggybacking, and the acknowledgement is
not received within a reasonable time period t3 (where
t3 > t2), the server sends the S-UARP response packet
again. If the S-UARP response packet is received by the
host and the ACK packet is lost on transit, the dupli-
cate response packets send by the server (after timeout
t3) would be rejected.
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5.4 Flow Chart for S-UARP
The flow chart for the S-UARP protocol can be shown as
in Figure 9. It depicts the scenario when Host A wants to
communicate to Host B (or a general Host X) and how the
protocol works with respect to different time durations.
Note in Figure 9, t1 is the maximum time period for
S-UARP response arrival (if it fails, host A would send
another request), t2 is the maximum wait time for sending
piggybacked ACK, t3 is the maximum acknowledgement
wait time for sending ACK packet, where t3 > t2 (if t >
t3, the server would send response again) and t4 is the
maximum wait time, until S-UARP cache is refreshed.
5.5 Alternate S-UARP Protocols (with
more security)
One of the limitations of the above protocol is that the
request and the response are both in clear, though this is
not a serious threat considering the content of the packets.
Moreover, the message integrity is only on the server’s
response side.
Alternate Version 1: A better approach needs to
ensure the integrity of both S-UARP request and response
as follows:
1. A → DHCP+ : S-UARP req + MIC1
2. DHCP+ → A : S-UARP res + MIC2
3. A → DHCP+ : (ACK, NRN) KSA
In this protocol, we assume that a random number RN
is known to both host and the server and is kept secret
(generated by A or DHCP+). In step 1, A sends the
request in clear and the MIC (i.e. MIC1). The MIC1 is
generated using a collision-free one-way hash function like
SHA1 that takes the secret key KSA,, the S-UARP req
and the random number RN as inputs. That means,
MIC1 = H(KSA, RN, S-UARP req). In step 2, the server
uses the S-UARP req (in plain text), the known random
number RN and secret key, KSA to create a similar MIC
(say, MIC1*). If MIC1 = MIC1*, then the request is ac-
cepted else it will be rejected. After verifying the integrity
of the message, the server sends the response and MIC2
to the host. The MIC2 is generated in the same way (i.e.
MIC2 = H(KSA, RN, S-UARP res). Finally in step 3,
Host A will check the integrity of the response as in the
above case (to see MIC2 = MIC2*). Host A then sends
an acknowledgement and a new random number (NRN)
encrypted by the secret key (KSA). NRN can be used
in the next request/response exchange. As in the first
protocol, the acknowledgment contains the timestamp to
check when the server sent the response to the host, thus
protecting against replay attacks.
Alternate Version 2: Another more secure alter-
native is to use a session key SK and an Exclusive-OR
(XOR) operation as follows:
1. A → DHCP+ : S-UARP req + MIC1
Figure 9: The flowchart showing the procedure of S-
UARP operation.
2. DHCP+→ A : S- UARP res + SK ⊕ MIC2 + MIC3
3. A → DHCP+ : MIC4
Here, MIC1 = H(KSA, RN, S-UARP req), MIC2 =
H(KSA, S-UARP req, S-UARP res), MIC3 = H(SK ,
NRN), and MIC4 = H(SK , ACK, NRN). In this proto-
col, the RN is generated by the server and is also known
to host as a secret. In step 1, A sends the request and
the MIC1 (using the key KSA, RN and S-UARP req).
In step 2, the server checks the integrity of the mes-
sage (as shown in the previous protocols), and sends S-
UARP res, SK⊕MIC2 and MIC3 to A. MIC2 and MIC3
are generated using the secret key and the session key
respectively. MIC2 is XORed with session key, SK. In
step 3, host A checks the integrity of the message re-
ceived and then compute the acknowledgment as shown
in MIC4. This acknowledgement calculation involves the
timestamp as in previous cases. The NRN (generated by
A or DHCP+) is used by the server in MIC3 is also con-
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tained in MIC4 and is kept secret by both parties for the
next request/response exchange. It is clear here that even
when an attacker knows KSA, he will not be able to send
the acknowledgment or MIC4 as he does not know the
SK,used. As in the previous protocol, the attacker can-
not also reply an old message (replay attack) since the
ACK contains the timestamp when the server generated
the message in step 2. It should be noted here that in all
the three protocols, both requests and responses were sent
in clear to avoid extra encryption overhead. The main ob-
jective is to ensure that the message was not modified in
transit and to block the possibility of an ARP poisoning
by an attacker.
6 Issue of Static IP Addressing on
Hosts
In the previous section, we had ignored the issue of hav-
ing static IP addressing on hosts, where we discussed the
secure protocol with respect to dynamic IP addressing.
There is still a need for central server (DHCP-) when we
use static IP addressing, as follows:
The S-UARP protocol (for static IP addressing) is de-
scribed as follows in the 3 steps:
1. A → DHCP- : S-UARP req
2. DHCP- → A : S-UARP res + MIC
3. A → DHCP- : (ACK)KSA
When the clients power up they advertise their en-
crypted IP address and MAC address to a central server
(DHCP-), using the symmetric key. The DHCP- server
keeps a record of the IP address and MAC address of
all hosts in that network, much like a DHCP server, but
doesn’t issue IP addresses. It advertises its identity on
a frequent basis and this takes precedence over normal
DHCP addressing (if any) and clients would know whom
to contact during ARP request. The ARP requests would
then go unicast to DHCP- server from the clients as shown
before.
7 Co-existence of DHCP and
DHCP+ Servers
The DHCP+ server is an ‘improved’ implementation of
the normal DHCP server where it allows all DHCP queries
to be directed to itself with security options, than doing
a DHCP request broadcast as it is done in normal net-
works. If there is a situation where DHCP+ server im-
plementation and DHCP server exist in the same network,
the DHCP server needs to be patched to allow priority to
DHCP+ server, so that the IP address assignment would
only be done by the DHCP+ server. The software patch-
ing can help resolve the conflict of operation between the
two within a same network. So in a co-existence scenario,
the normal DHCP server would resign to a ‘passive’ mode
and DHCP+ server would be in an ‘active’ mode.
8 Mac Spoofing Attack and Im-
plementation
Mac spoofing is done where an attacker alters the
manufacturer-assigned MAC address to any other value
by using softwares like Mac Makeup[12] and [13] shows
details of such attack.
Figure 10: Mac Makeup software used to perform MAC
spoofing for Ethernet adapter
In a brief experiment on a wireless LAN, the MAC
address of the Intel PRO/Wireless LAN 2100 3B Mini
PCI Adapter that we were using was changed to the MAC
address of a 3Com ll Mbps USB wireless adapter that
was connected to the wireless network. Now it was found
that the MAC address (0006a7b350c) and the IP address
(172.20.122.88) assigned to the Intel Wireless Adapter is
identical to the 3Com adapter.
Figure 11: The IP address assigned to the attacker’s Eth-
ernet card
After identifying a MAC address to be spoofed, well-
published DoS attack against the target was launched to
cause the target’s terminal to crash. In a real life attack,
the attacker shall then immediately change the MAC ad-
dress, IP address and default gateway to the value the
target was using. With the target’s computer rebooting,
the attacker can access network resources bypassing the
WLAN security appliance.
After MAC spoofing using Mac Makeup software as
shown in Figure 10, the attacker’s Ethernet card showed
details as in Figure 11 and the overall network connection
details as in Figure 12.
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Figure 12: The spoofed IP and MAC address shown at
attacker’s computer
Figure 13: The spoofed IP and MAC address shown on
Access Point’s Association Table
In our case, the presence of firewall in Cisco AP was
bypassed when the Ethernet card was used to spoof the
MAC address of the wireless adapter and the Internet was
browsed on a computer that used spoofed address. The
access point’s association table showed that the attacker’s
computer using spoofed MAC address was connected to
wireless network as shown in figure 13.
9 Secure DHCP Protocol
The dynamic address assignment that is done by DHCP
server also needs to be secured, against hacking. MAC
spoofing can easily be done through software to alter
MAC addresses. We propose a secure DHCP (S-DHCP)
protocol to make it less prone to MAC spoofing attacks.
Related work was done by Komori and Saito in [14] and
another in [15]. Even if the MAC address is spoofed,
the secure DHCP server will not assign the IP address,
without proper credentials, as shown below. They don’t
take any additional steps than usual DHCP, except for
the MIC overhead. The S-DHCP protocol is described as
follows in 4 steps:
1. A → ALL: Broadcast S-DHCP DISCOVER
2. DHCP+→ A: S-DHCP OFFER + (MIC1)KSA (uni-
cast)
3. A → DHCP+: S-DHCP REQUEST + MIC1 +
MIC2, to all DHCP servers that responded.
4. DHCP+ → A: S-DHCP ACK (unicast)
Explanation of the secure version is generally similar
to that for secure ARP. Host A broadcast a normal S-
DHCP DISCOVER message packet. The DHCP+ server
responds with a unicast secure S-DHCP OFFER mes-
sage (that contains the IP address) appended with an
encrypted Message Integrity Code (MIC1) using KSA.
KSA is the shared secret key between host A and DHCP+
server. MIC1 can be the CBC residue that is derived using
DES CBC encryption method or the like, as outlined be-
fore under secure ARP. Host A would verify this message,
by doing the same operation on the message and checks
the result with MIC1 to see if it is same. Host A then re-
sponds by sending a secure S-DHCP REQUEST message
appended with MIC1 and MIC2. MIC2 can be the CBC
residue from encrypting S-DHCP REQUEST. DHCP+
server verifies this and sends a unicast acknowledgment
S-DHCP ACK to host A. ACK contains the timestamp
ts generated by the server to ensure that the message is
fresh and is not a replay. S-DHCP ACK can be optionally
encrypted with KSA. Only when DHCP+ server issues
the ACK (step 4) that the IP address to client would be
confirmed.
Alternate Version 1: Another secure version of the
protocol is shown as follows:
1. A →ALL: Broadcast S-DHCP DISCOVER + MIC1
2. DHCP+ →A: S-DHCP OFFER + MIC2 (unicast)
3. A →DHCP+: S-DHCP REQUEST + MIC3, to all
DHCP servers that responded.
4. DHCP+ →A: (S-DHCP ACK, NRN) KSA (unicast)
Where, MIC1= H(KSA, RN, S-DHCP DISCOVER),
MIC2 = H(KSA, RN, S-DHCP OFFER) and MIC3 =
H(KSA, RN, S-DHCP REQUEST). Explanation of the
above protocol is similar to that has been done for secure
ARP. In this protocol, we assume that a random number
RN is known to both host and the server and is kept secret
(generated by A or DHCP+). In step 1, A broadcasts the
request in clear and the MIC (i.e. MIC1). The MIC1 is
generated using a collision-free one-way hash function like
SHA1 that takes the secret key KSA,, the S-DHCP DIS-
COVER and the random number RN as inputs, as listed
above. In step 2, the server uses the S-DHCP DISCOVER
(in plain text), the known random number RN and secret
key, KSA to create a similar MIC (say, MIC1*). If MIC1
= MIC1*, then the request is accepted or else it will be
rejected. After verifying the integrity of the message, the
server sends the response and MIC2 to the host. The
MIC2 is generated in the same way and is shown above.
Finally in step 3, Host A will check the integrity of the
response as in the above case (to see MIC2 = MIC2*).
Host A then sends S-DHCP REQUEST (in plain) along
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Table 1: Details of ARP packets in captured files
Session No. of No. of No. of Avg. ARP % of ARP
No. hosts in total ARP packet size pkts
n/w pkts pkts (bytes)
1 48 28366 1326 51.67 4.67
2 45 15539 656 59.15 4.22
3 45 10331 557 59.02 5.39
4 46 15298 650 59.15 4.25
5 48 12511 668 59.24 5.34
6 45 17614 677 59.19 3.84
7 50 11103 646 59.16 5.82
8 48 16909 675 59.22 3.99
9 45 11666 583 59.09 5.00
10 42 11479 562 58.93 4.90
with MIC3, as in previous steps. Finally, the server would
check the integrity of the message from A and sends an
acknowledgement and a new random number (NRN) en-
crypted by the secret key (KSA). NRN can be used in the
next request/response exchange.
Alternate Version 2: Another more secure version
of the protocol is given below.
1. A→ ALL: Broadcast S-DHCP DISCOVER + MIC1
2. DHCP+ →A: S-DHCP OFFER + SK ⊕ MIC2 +
MIC3
3. A → DHCP+: S-DHCP REQUEST+ SK ⊕ MIC4
+ MIC5, to all DHCP servers that responded.
4. DHCP+ →A: MIC6
Where, MIC1 = H(KSA, RN, S-DHCP DISCOVER),
MIC2 = H(KSA, S-DHCP DISCOVER, S-
DHCP OFFER), MIC3 = H(SK , NRN), MIC4 =
H(KSA, S-DHCP OFFER, S-DHCP REQUEST), MIC5
= H(SK , NRN) and MIC6 = H(SK , S-DHCP ACK,
NRN). In this protocol, the RN is generated by the
server and is also known to host as a secret. In step
1, A broadcasts S-DHCP DISCOVER and the MIC1.
In step 2, the server checks the integrity of the mes-
sage (as shown in the previous protocols), and sends
S-DHCP OFFER, SK⊕MIC2 and MIC3 to A. MIC2
and MIC3 are generated using the secret key and the
session key respectively. MIC2 is XORed with session
key, SK. In step 3, host A checks the integrity of the
message (as shown in the previous protocols), and sends
S-DHCP REQUEST, SK⊕MIC4 and MIC5 to server.
MIC4 and MIC5 are generated using the secret key and
the session key respectively. MIC4 is XORed with session
key, SK.In step 4, the server checks the integrity of the
message received and then computes the acknowledgment
as shown in MIC6. This acknowledgement calculation
involves the timestamp as in previous cases. The NRN
(generated by A or DHCP+) is used by the server in
MIC3 (which is also contained in MIC5 and MIC6) is
kept secret by both parties for the next request/response
exchange. It is clear here that even when an attacker
knows KSA, he will not be able to send the acknowledg-
ment or MIC4 as he does not know the SK,used. As in
the previous protocol, the attacker cannot also reply an
old message (replay attack) since the ACK contains the
timestamp when host A generated the message in step 3.
10 Performance Analysis of ARP
and DHCP Protocols
We captured live packet traffic from a wired office network
using Ethereal software [12] and filtered all the ARP pack-
ets out to do an analysis of ARP packets as in Figure 14.
The traffic analysis below shows the percentage of ARP
packets found in packet samples collected for around 30
minutes each during 10 sessions. This is shown in Ta-
ble 1. On the average the network contained around 40
to 50 hosts (clients and servers), including print servers.
There were five HP Jet-Direct Print Servers, three Canon
Network Print Servers and one D-Link Print Server. The
operating system platform was mostly Windows XP on
clients, along with Linux server and Netware Server. The
percentage of ARP packets was found to be around 4%
to 5% of the total traffic.
When we calculate S-UARP packet details, we assume
that the channel is free of errors and there are no retrans-
missions required. Also we assume that the ACK is pig-
gybacked every time. The Table 2 shows the Broadcast
Packet Reduction because of S-UARP implementation.
The S-UARP packet count is done by finding the number
of ARP replies and multiplying that by 2.
This is because S-UARP is unicast and hence there
would only be 2 packets exchanged (request and reply)
between host and server, excluding the ACK packets. So
the calculation can be as follows: No. of S-UARP pack-
ets (no ACK) = 2 x No. of ARP reply packets. To get
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Table 2: ARP, S-UARP (no ACK) and SARP Comparison
No. No. of No. of No. of % of ARP % of % of
total ARP S-UARP pkts pkts S-UARP SARP
pkts pkts [No ACK] pkts pkts
1 28366 1326 228 4.67 0.80 7.09
2 15539 656 60 4.22 0.39 5.38
3 10331 557 62 5.39 0.60 7.19
4 15298 650 64 4.25 0.42 5.50
5 12511 668 58 5.34 0.46 6.73
6 17614 677 62 3.84 0.35 4.90
7 11103 646 62 5.82 0.56 7.49
8 16909 675 60 3.99 0.35 5.06
9 11666 583 60 5.00 0.51 6.54
10 11479 562 72 4.90 0.63 6.78
Average Broadcast Packet Reduction in S-UARP (w.r.to ARP) = 09.77 times
Figure 14: Sample of ARP Packet capture using Ethereal.
the ARP reply packets, we need to use the ethereal soft-
ware. Ethereal filter can be enabled with the expression,
arp.opcode == 0x2, which is the opcode for ARP reply
packet, to get all the ARP reply packets as in Figure 15.
It’s quite clear when the number of computers in the
network increases the ARP broadcast can still be higher.
The results in Table 2 show that there is a reduction
in unwanted broadcast packets by 9.77 times (excluding
ACK packets, which is piggybacked). The value is an
average of 10 samples. SARP is any other secure ARP
scheme that uses PKI infrastructure that needs 4 steps to
complete an ARP request cycle. The comparison graph
can be as in Figure 16.
The S-UARP channel link utilization with ACK pack-
ets is shown in Table 3. Here we assume the worst case
of no piggybacking ACK. Thus ACK is sent as a sepa-
rate packet. Again, we don’t consider any retransmission
cases here and assume that the channel is free of such
errors. The no. of S-UARP packets (with ACK) = 3 x
No. of ARP reply packets; As 3 packets are needed to
be exchanged here for one cycle – i.e. S-UARP request,
Figure 15: Sample of ARP Reply packets captured using
Ethereal.
S-UARP response and ACK.
Figure 16: Host Channel Link Utilization (ARP, S-UARP
without ACK, S-UARP with ACK and SARP).
There can be a 6.50 times reduction in congestion
through S-UARP packets (with ACK) as seen in Table
3. The comparison line graph can be as shown in Figure
16. Assuming that, piggybacking can happen with ACK
transmission (host to DHCP+ server) for about 50% time,
the Broadcast Packet Reduction can be around 8.13 times
(average of previous two cases) than in a normal ARP sce-
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Table 3: ARP, S-UARP (with ACK) and SARP Comparison
No. No. of No. of No. of % of ARP % of % of
total ARP S-UARP pkts pkts S-UARP SARP
pkts pkts [No ACK] pkts pkts
1 28366 1326 342 4.67 1.21 7.09
2 15539 656 90 4.22 0.58 5.38
3 10331 557 93 5.39 0.90 7.19
4 15298 650 96 4.25 0.63 5.50
5 12511 668 87 5.34 0.70 6.73
6 17614 677 93 3.84 0.53 4.90
7 11103 646 93 5.82 0.84 7.49
8 16909 675 90 3.99 0.53 5.06
9 11666 583 90 5.00 0.77 6.54
10 11479 562 108 4.90 0.94 6.78
Average Broadcast Packet Reduction in S-UARP (w.r.to ARP) = 6.50 times
nario. This is quite a good result.
Figure 17: Overall time consumed per session for each of
the ARP schemes (ARP vs. three S-UARP versions).
Considering that the encryption operation to carry a
factor of 2, compared to a normal operation, the time
consumption for the different ARP schemes would be as
shown in Figure 17. Here any step that uses encryp-
tion (considering the encryption and decryption process)
is given double the weight of a normal step without en-
cryption. S-UARP 1, S-UARP 2 and S-UARP 3 are the
three proposed schemes with increasing security. It shows
SUARP scheme with light encryption is better in time
than normal ARP. Figure 18 shows the graph, ignoring
encryption performed on ACK.
Since secure DHCP(S-DHCP) uses the same number
of steps as its original version, the only overhead encoun-
tered would be that of calculating MICs, appending them
etc. Like before, a factor of 2 is assigned to all encryption
steps. The Figure 19 shows the comparisons, for each of
the 10 sessions for a random sample of packets. It is right
to infer from the graph that the basic version with mini-
mum security (S-DHCP version 1) has lesser computation
overhead and lesser delay.
Figure 18: Overall time consumed per session for each
of the ARP schemes (ARP vs. three S-UARP versions),
ignoring the encryption performed for ACK sent.
Figure 19: Overall time consumed per session for each of
the DHCP schemes (DHCP vs. three S-DHCP versions).
11 Conclusion
Though some initiatives had been there to mitigate ARP
poisoning, the new S-UARP protocol (along with secure
DHCP) is more efficient in terms of performance and se-
curity. It reduces broadcast congestion in network, since
the S-UARP request is unicast and directed to only the
secure DHCP server. It is quite difficult for an attacker to
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do ARP poisoning attack, especially on the more secure
versions of S-UARP. It is thus protected against message
integrity attacks (when ARP packet content can be mod-
ified by attacker) and masquerading attacks (when new
ARP bogus packet injection can be done by attacker).
Also since the DHCP protocol is made secure, the MAC
spoofing attacks are also eliminated. The performance
analysis of both the protocols are also discussed. This
proposal is mostly relevant to IPv4 networks, since ARP
is implemented only in IPv4 networks. IPv6 networks use
a different mechanism (called Neighbor Discovery Proto-
col). Nevertheless it is quite relevant until a whole con-
version to IPv6 from IPv4 fully happens.
Acknowledgments
This paper is a major extension of the paper titled – “Se-
cure Unicast Address Resolution Protocol (S-UARP) by
Extending DHCP” that was presented during ICON 2005,
Malaysia.
References
[1] A. S. Tanenbaum, Computer Networks, 4th edition,
Prentice Hall PTR, pp.450-454, 2003.
[2] D. C. Plummer, “RFC 826 -ARP Protocol”, 1982.
(http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc826.html)
[3] C. M. Kozierok, The TCP/IP Guide Web-
site, 2005. (http://www.tcpipguide.com/free/
t ARPMessageFormat.htm)
[4] R. Droms, “RFC 2131 –Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol”, 1997.
(http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2131.html)
[5] S. Alexander, “RFC 2132 –DHCP Options
and BOOTP Vendor Extensions”, 1997.
(http://rfc.net/rfc2132.html)
[6] C. Nachreiner, ”Anatomy of an ARP Poi-
soning Attack”, Washington, USA, 2003.
(http://www.watchguard.com/infocenter/editorial/
135324.asp)
[7] The Ethereal Software, version 0.99.0
(http://www.ethereal.com)
[8] The Cain & Abel Software, version 2.5
(htp://www.oxidt.it and http://www.nwcet.org/
downloads/cainAbel.pdf)
[9] D. Bruschi, A. Ornaghi and E. Rosti, “S-ARP: a
Secure Address Resolution Protocol”, 19th Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference, pp.66-
74, Nevada, USA, 2003.
[10] M. V. Tripunitara and P. Dutta. A middleware ap-
proach to asynchronous and backward compatible
detection and prevention of ARP cache poisoning, in
the Proceedings of the 15th Annual Computer Secu-
rity Application Conference (ACSAC), pp 303-309,
1999.
[11] Larry L. Peterson and Bruce S. Davie, Computer
Networks – A systems approach, 3rd edition, pp.583-
601, Morgan Kaufmann (Elsevier), 2003.
[12] The Mac Makeup Software, version 1.71d
(http://www.gorlani.com/publicprj/MacMakeUp/
macmakeup.asp)
[13] J. Wright, Detecting Wireless LAN
MAC Address Spoofing, Johnson and
Wales University, GCIH, CCNA, 2003.
(http://home.jwu.edu/jwright/papers/wlan-mac-
spoof.pdf)
[14] T. Komori and T. Saito, The secure DHCP system
with user authentication, in the Proceedings of the
27th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer
Networks (LCN), pp. 123-131, Florida, USA, 2002.
[15] H. Altunbasak, S. Krasser, H. Owen, J. Sokol. and J.
Grimminger, Addressing the weak link between layer
2 and layer 3 in the Internet architecture, in the Pro-
ceedings of 29th Annual IEEE International Confer-
ence on Local Computer Networks (LCN), pp.417-
418, Florida, USA, 2004.
Biju Issac is a lecturer in Information Tech-
nology at Swinburne University of Technol-
ogy (Sarawak Campus), Malaysia. He is hold-
ing a BEng (Electronics and Communica-
tion Engineering) degree along with an MCA
(Master of Computer Application) with Hon-
ours from Calicut University, India. He is
an IEEE, IEEE Communication Society and
IEEE Education Society member. His re-
search interests are mainly in computer net-
works and education. Specifically, his re-
search interest is in mobility management, wireless and network
security, education and e-learning. He is heading the network se-
curity research in Information and Security Research (iSECURES)
Lab in Swinburne. He has a number of refereed publications that
includes many conference papers, journal papers and book chapters.
